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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper will examine the background law regarding environmental offences under 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), prosecution trends, sentencing for RMA 
offences (including principles of sentencing, sentencing discretion, legislative 
guidance, appellate guidance, guideline judgments, and tariffs), the use of costs in 
conjunction with sentencing, recent appeal judgments, and finally draw conclusions 
regarding consistency and sentencing in relation to environmental offences. Where 
relevant comparisons will be made with the Australian jurisdictions. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”) is a sophisticated statute which 
restated and reformed the law relating to the use of land, air, and water.  It governs the 
use and development of terrestrial natural and physical resources (including the 
subdivision of land), and the coastal marine area within the 12 nautical mile limits of 
the territorial sea. 
 
Like similar environmental statutes in other common law jurisdictions the RMA 
provides for the preparation of policy statements and plans at national, regional, and 
district level to guide decision making under the statute; for applications to be made 
regarding the use and development of natural and physical resources, and for the 
determination of applications by the relevant Local Authority or by the Environment 
Court on appeal; and for enforcement regarding unlawful activities. 
 
Environmental management under the RMA is delegated to Local Authorities 
(Regional Councils and Territorial Authorities).  Territorial Authorities (City and 
District Councils) are generally responsible for regulating land use activities and 
subdivision, whilst Regional Councils are responsible for regulating activities within 
the Coastal Marine Area, the use of lake and river beds, the take and use of water, and 
the discharge of contaminants into the environment. 
 
The RMA takes a permissive attitude to the use and development of land, which is 
generally allowed under s 9 unless the activity contravenes a rule contained in a 
Regional or District Plan.  In contrast, a restrictive approach is adopted by the RMA 
regarding all other activities (including subdivision) which require prior approval by 
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the grant of resource consent, unless the activity is expressly permitted by a rule 
contained in a Regional or District Plan.i 
 
The exercise of functions, powers, and duties under the RMA is guided by a single, 
overarching, statutory purpose – the promotion of sustainable management, which 
requires decision makers to take a holistic view of the environment and that any 
adverse effects of carrying out activities should be avoided, remedied, or mitigated.  
Section 5 provides: 
 
5. Purpose 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources. 
(2) In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a 
rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while— 
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on 
the environment. 
 
In the context of sentencing for environmental offences the Courts have held that 
when determining the appropriate sentence that should be imposed regarding offences 
against the RMA the sentencing Judge is entitled to have regard to the purpose and 
principles on which the legislation is founded.  For example, in R v Conway the Court 
of Appeal stated: 
 
[69] The extended definition of sustainable management in s 5(2) emphasises 
(amongst other things) the statutory purpose of avoiding, remedying or 
mitigating adverse effects on the environment … 
[70] In cases such as this, these provisions assist the sentencing Judge to 
identify the matters which Parliament considers to be significant where 
breaches under the Act are alleged and to assess accordingly the impacts of the 
offender’s conduct as well as the extent of culpability. 
 
This confirms the relevance of s 5 to all decision making under the RMA irrespective 
of whether the jurisdiction being exercised is civil or criminal. 
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ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE RMA 
 
A variety of tools are provided for enforcement of the RMA including: 
 
• The making of declarations by the Environment Court;ii 
• The making of enforcement orders by the Environment Court;iii 
• The service of abatement notices by enforcement officersiv warranted by 
Local Authorities;v 
• The prosecution of offences in the District Court;vi and 
• The service of infringement notices by enforcement officers warranted 
by Local Authorities. 
 
Criminal jurisdiction under the RMA is exercised by the District Court.  Judges of the 
Environment Court also hold warrants as District Court Judges, and commonly (but 
not exclusively) preside when offences against the RMA are brought before the Court. 
 
The discretion to take enforcement action, including prosecution, is exercised by the 
relevant Local Authority and arises where: 
 
• Land use is carried on in a manner that contravenes a rule in a District 
Plan, or the terms and conditions of a resource consent;vii 
• Subdivision is carried on without express authorisation by a rule in a 
District Plan or by a resource consent;viii 
• Use of the coastal marine area is carried on without express 
authorisation by a rule in a Regional Coastal Plan or by a resource 
consent;ix 
• Use of the beds of lakes and rivers is carried on without express 
authorisation by a rule in a Regional Plan or by a resource consent;x 
• Water is taken, used, dammed, or diverted without express authorisation 
by a rule in a Regional Plan or by a resource consent;xi 
• Contaminants are discharged into the environment without express 
authorisation by a rule in a Regional Plan or by a resource consent;xii 
• Carrying on an activity in breach of the terms of an enforcement order or 
an abatement notice.xiii 
 
Offences against the RMA are prescribed by s 338, and s 339 sets out the penalties or 
sentencing options available to the District Court on conviction.  Section 338 of the 
RMA prescribes three levels of criminal offences: 
 
• First, the group of offences prescribed by s 338(1) which deal with situations 
where the offender has carried on activities without having obtained the 
relevant resource consent, or where activities are carried out in breach of the 
terms and conditions of the relevant resource consent, or where activities are 
carried out in breach of the terms and conditions of any enforcement order 
made by the Environment Court or any abatement notice served by an 
enforcement officer.  These offences are punishable by a sentence of up to two 
years imprisonment or a fine of up to $200,000 and a fine of up to $10,000 per 
day for continuing offences. 
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• Second, the group of offences prescribed by s 338(2) deal with situations 
where the offender has failed to comply with procedural requirements under 
the RMA such as failure by the offender to provide details of his or her name 
and address to an enforcement officer, or where activities are carried out in 
breach of the terms and conditions of an excessive noise direction or an 
abatement notice for unreasonable noise, or where activities are carried out in 
breach of the terms and conditions of any order made by the Environment 
Court (except breach of an enforcement order).  These offences are punishable 
by a fine of up to $10,000 and a fine of up to $1,000 per day for continuing 
offences. 
• Third, the group of offences prescribed by s 338(3) which deal with situations 
where the offender has obstructed a person executing their powers under the 
RMA, or where the offender has failed to attend the Environment Court when 
required to do so or has failed to co-operate with the Court, or where the 
offender has failed to comply with a witness summons under s 283 of the 
RMA, or where activities are carried out in breach of the terms and conditions 
of an esplanade strip or easement for access.  These offences are punishable by 
a fine of up to $1,500. 
 
The sentencing options provided under s 339(1)-(3) of the RMA indicate the relative 
seriousness with which the different levels of offences are viewed by Parliament. 
 
However, it is for note that although the RMA has been subject to regular statutory 
review and whilst 15 Amendment Acts have been passed during the period 1993-
2007, there has been no revision of maximum fine levels since the RMA came into 
force in October 1991.  When measured against inflation the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand CPI Inflation Calculator shows that a “basket” of goods and services that cost 
$200,000 in October 1991, would have cost $280,946 in October 2007.  This 
represents a total percentage change of 40.5%, or a compound average annual rate of 
inflation of 2.1%. 
 
Defences are provided under ss 340(2), 340(3), and 341 of the RMA.  Section 340(2) 
of the RMA provides for the liability of principals for the acts of agents (including 
employees and contractors).    An alleged offender will have a good defence under s 
340(2) of the RMA if he or she can prove that: 
 
• They did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have known that 
an offence was being committed or was to be committed, or in the case of a 
company that the directors and persons concerned in management of the 
company did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have known 
that an offence was being committed or was to be committed; 
• That all reasonable steps were taken to prevent commission of the offence; and 
• That all reasonable steps were taken to remedy any adverse effects of the 
offence. 
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In Auckland Regional Council v Bitumix  xiv the District Court held that s 340(2) of the 
RMA applies in circumstances where: 
 
… two distinct entities are involved in the commission of the alleged acts.  
One, the defendant charged and two, some other person acting as an agent or 
employee of that defendant.  In those circumstances s 340 has the effect of 
rendering both the principal and the agent liable for the acts complained of. 
 
It is also clear from the decision in Auckland Regional Council v AFFCO Allied 
Products Ltd xv that a high standard of conduct will be required on the part of the 
defendant in order to prove a defence under s 340(2) of the RMA.  For example, 
AFFCO was charged with offences regarding the discharge of contaminants from its 
hide processing plant and fellmongery into a stream via the stormwater system.  The 
offences occurred when a contractor cleaning out cesspits blocked a valve and 
contaminants were diverted from the trade waste system into the stormwater system.  
The District Court held that AFFCO could not establish the defence because: 
 
AFFCO was in control of the site and in a position to control the activities of 
its contractor.  To the extent that it could and should have controlled the 
activity at the point where the pollution occurred it is responsible for the 
pollution.  The defendant company actively undertook the operations 
conducted at its Wiri Plant including the responsibility for the collection and 
disposal of waste material on site.  It cannot abdicate its responsibilities 
simply by employing an agent to undertake that work on its behalf.  It was in a 
position to exercise continued control of that activity and to prevent the 
pollution from occurring but failed to do so. 
 
Section 340(3) of the RMA provides that where a company is convicted of an offence 
against the RMA, the directors and persons concerned in the management of the 
company shall be deemed to be guilty of the same offence in cases where the Local 
Authority can prove: 
 
• That the act which constituted the offence took place with the director’s or 
manager’s authority, permission, or consent; and 
• That the director or manager knew or could reasonably be expected to have 
known that the offence was being committed or was to be committed, and that 
he or she failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop it. 
 
However, the decision in R v Lorenzen illustrates that company director’s may incur 
personal liability for offences against the RMA by virtue of their personal 
involvement in the act which constituted the offence, independent of the deemed 
liability imposed by s 340(3).  Lorenzen was the sole director of a company that had 
engaged a contractor who “altered native and exotic vegetation” contrary to the rules 
in the relevant District Plan.  The company was not charged with the offences 
notwithstanding the fact that it owned the subject site, and the contractor could not be 
found.  For example, the District Court held: 
 
In summary the Crown here does not need to rely upon ownership of the land.  
It does not need to charge the company to be able to proceed against this 
defendant.  His liability could arise either directly through s 338(1) as the 
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person contravening the relevant provision, or permitting its contravention, or 
alternatively his liability could arise as a party under s 66 of the Crimes Act.  
There is sufficient evidence referred to in the depositions to show his personal 
involvement in the control of what was happening on this land and in my view 
a reasonable jury, properly instructed on the law, could well come to the 
conclusion that he is guilty of the offences charged.xvi 
 
Section 341 of the RMA provides for strict liability.  For example, regarding 
contravention of the duties and restrictions in ss 9 and 11-15 of the RMA (failure to 
carry out activities in accordance with the terms and conditions of a valid resource 
consent or in accordance with any relevant permitted activity rule contained in a 
Regional or District Plan) s 341(1) provides that it is not necessary to prove that the 
defendant intended to commit the offence.  Defences are provided by s 341(2) 
regarding due diligence and force majeure where the defendant proves: 
 
• That the action or event to which the prosecution relates was necessary for the 
purposes of saving or protecting life or health, or preventing serious damage to 
property or avoiding an actual or likely adverse effect on the environment; and 
• That his or her conduct was reasonable in the circumstances; and 
• That the adverse effects of the offence were adequately mitigated or remedied 
after it occurred; or 
• That the action or event to which the prosecution relates was due to an event 
beyond his or her control including natural disaster, mechanical failure, or 
sabotage; and 
• That the action or event could not reasonably have been foreseen or provided 
against by the defendant; and 
• That the adverse effects of the offence were adequately mitigated or remedied 
after it occurred. 
 
In order to take advantage of the defences provided by s 341(2)(a) or (b) of the RMA, 
the defendant is required to give written notice of the facts supporting the defence 
within 7 days of service of the summons, or within such further time as the Court may 
allow.  Leave of the Court is required where notice is given out of time. 
 
The defence of “necessity” in s 341(2)(a) of the RMA was considered in Fugle v 
Cowie  xvii regarding works carried out in the bed of a trout stream during spawning.  
The High Court held that the test is objective and requires that the action or event 
should be “reasonably necessary” as opposed to being “merely desirable”, that the 
defence will not be available when sufficient time was available to apply for resource 
consent before carrying out the works, that the action or event cannot be categorised 
as “necessary” when unacceptable damage is caused, and that the defendant’s conduct 
cannot be described as “reasonable” when the adverse effects of the action or event 
can be remedied but where certain adverse effects have not been mitigated or 
remedied. 
 
Section 342 provides that where a person is convicted of an offence against the RMA, 
the Court shall order that 90% of any fine imposed on the defendant be paid to the 
Local Authority which laid the information and that 10% of any fine be paid into the 
Crown Bank Account. 
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PROSECUTION TRENDS 
 
Enforcement and prosecution are discretionary activities.  In New Zealand there are 
no statutory guidelines available to guide Local Authorities or Enforcement Officers 
when deciding whether enforcement action should be taken in any given case, and the 
devolved nature of environmental management under the RMA results in individual 
Local Authorities giving different priorities (both political and financial) to 
enforcement and prosecution within their respective administrative areas. 
 
Monitoring of Local Authority performance under the RMA has been carried out by 
the Ministry for the Environment on a bi-annual basis since 1996/1997.  The most 
recent reports covering the period 2001-2006 (summarised in Table 1 below) reveal a 
gradual decline in Court action, and increased reliance being given to the use of 
functions and powers under direct Local Authority control.  There is no reliable data 
available regarding enforcement for the period 1996-2000. 
 
Table 1 
Period Enforcement 
Orders 
Abatement 
Notices 
Infringement 
Notices 
Prosecutions 
2001/2002 27 838 394 74 
2003/2004 25 889 887 31 
2005/2006 21 1004 860 60 
Source: Ministry for the Environment RMA Survey of Local Authorities 2001/2002, 
2003/2004, and 2005/2006. 
 
The increased use of abatement notices and infringement notices indicates that there 
has been a general increase in the detection of minor breaches of the RMA.  Similarly, 
the decrease in civil and criminal Court action indicates either that there may have 
been a general decrease in the occurrence of more serious breaches of the RMA, or 
that there has been a gradual switch by Local Authorities away from using Court 
action as the appropriate response to breaches of the RMA.  Studies of RMA 
prosecutions, however, do not reveal any reduction in the frequency of serious 
offending. 
 
The Ministry for the Environment has also commissioned two studies of prosecutions 
under the RMA from Karenza de Silva, an experienced environmental lawyer and 
prosecutor.  The first study covered the period 1 October 1991 to 30 June 2001.  The 
second study covered the period 1 July 2001 to 30 April 2005. 
 
During the period covered by the first study 375 prosecutions were analysed.  The 
largest percentage of prosecutions (47%) were commenced regarding discharges of 
contaminants into water.  The commercial sector represented the largest group (41%) 
of defendants.  Most prosecutions (269) were commenced by Regional Councils, with 
the Auckland Regional Council being responsible for commencing 33% of 
prosections.  The outcome of the prosecutions during the period 1991-2001 was:xviii 
 
• In 80% of cases the defendant pleaded guilty; 
• A conviction was obtained in 87% of cases; 
• The defendant was discharged without conviction in (14) 3.7% of cases; 
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• In most cases fines were imposed on the defendants; 
• In 36 cases an enforcement order was made by the Court; 
• In four cases the defendants were sentenced to community service; 
• None of the defendants were sentenced to periodic detention; 
• In two cases suspended sentences were imposed; 
• None of the defendants was sentenced to a term of imprisonment; 
• The average fine was $4,400; 
• The highest fine was $50,000 in Taranaki Regional Council v Petrocorp 
Exploration Ltd xix regarding the discharge of drilling mud, crude oil, and 
hydrocarbons from an oil rig into a stream. 
 
During the period covered by the second study 171 prosecutions were analysed.  The 
largest percentage of prosecutions (43%) were commenced regarding discharges of 
contaminants into water.  The agricultural sector represented the largest group (37%) 
of defendants.  Most prosecutions were commenced by Regional Councils, with the 
Waikato Regional Council and Southland Regional Council each being responsible 
for commencing 14% of prosections.  The outcome of the prosecutions during the 
period 2001-2005 was:xx 
 
• In 82% of cases the defendant pleaded guilty; 
• A conviction was obtained in 90% of cases; 
• In four cases the defendants were discharged without conviction; 
• In most cases fines were imposed on the defendants; 
• In 21 cases an enforcement order was made by the Court; 
• In eight cases the defendants were sentenced to community service; 
• In three cases the defendants were sentenced to periodic detention; 
• In two cases suspended sentences were imposed; 
• In two cases the defendants were sentenced to a term of imprisonment; 
• The average fine was $5,631; 
• The highest fine was $55,000 in Auckland Regional Council v Nuplex 
Industries Ltd regarding the discharge into air of ethyl acrylate in breach of 
consent conditions.  The unauthorised activity occurred for only one day. 
 
The general trend during both periods shows an increase in the number of convictions, 
and an increase in the average fine level.  Overall, the studies show a general 
improvement in compliance by the commercial sector, and an increase in non-
compliance by the agricultural sector.  However, in both periods the highest fines 
were imposed regarding unauthorised activities in the industrial sector. 
 
More extensive use was made of the sentencing options available to the Court during 
the second period with suspended sentences being imposed in two cases, and terms of 
imprisonment being imposed in two cases.  However, compared with the maximum 
fine of up to $200,000 provided for under s 339 of the RMA, the highest fines 
imposed during both periods have remained static within the range of $50,000 to 
$55,000 and have not exceeded 30% of the statutory maximum. 
 
The studies also show a general decrease in the number of Local Authorities who 
brought prosecutions under the RMA.  For example, during the first period 42 out of 
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86 Local Authorities brought prosecutions under the RMA, compared with 17 out of 
86 Local Authorities during the second period. 
 
From an Australian perspective Rosemary Martin has carried out a review of Trends 
in Environmental Prosecution.xxi  Her paper notes a number of developments in the 
Australian jurisdictions: 
 
• The introduction of alternative sentencing mechanisms in Victoria under s 
67AC of the Environment Protection Act 1970 which enables the Court to 
require the offence to be publicised in the media or by notice to specified 
persons or groups of persons, to make an order requiring the offender to carry 
out a specified restoration or enhancement project either related to the harm 
caused by the offence or in relation to some positive environmental effect 
unrelated to the offence, or to require the offender to prepare an environmental 
audit regarding its activities.  Significantly, such orders can be made in 
combination with each other, fines can be imposed in addition, and fines can 
be imposed and orders made without conviction. 
• The introduction of a new enforcement culture in Western Australia following 
release by the Minister for the Environment of the Review of the Enforcement 
and Prosecution Guidelines of the Department of Environmental Protection of 
Western Australia in February 2003:xxii 
 
One of the difficulties identified with the existing enforcement 
guidelines (dating from January 2001) was that the tone of the 
document and language used appeared “to strongly discourage 
prosecution except when all other avenues have been exhausted”.  
While reflecting on the reasons for the acceptance of the “last resort” 
policy which had been adopted by environmental agencies elsewhere 
in the past, [the review] considered that the approach “reflected 
resource constraints, inadequate training, discomfort with using the 
‘stick’ and a lack of organization self-confidence leading to a reticence 
about offending those who were seen to wield power and influence”. 
Following [the] recommendations … A revised Enforcement and 
Prosecution Policy was released in November 2004.  One of the 
Principles of Enforcement states that “prosecution is an enforcement 
tool to be employed where it is the appropriate response to a particular 
circumstance and is not an enforcement option to be applied only as a 
last resort”.  The position could not be made clearer. 
 
• The imposition of a record $450,000 penalty by the Federal Court of Australia 
under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Commonwealth) regarding the unauthorised clearance of an internationally 
important wetland.  Martin observed:xxiii 
 
This is the heaviest penalty yet to be imposed on an Australian 
landholder for damage to the environment and is the first civil 
prosecution against a party in relation to a matter of national 
environmental significance under the EPBC Act. 
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• The tiered approach to enforcement in New South Wales where significant 
fines (e.g. $250,000 in one case) have been imposed for offences requiring 
proof of mens rea. 
• Martin also made some interesting observations in her paper on factors that 
may influence prosecution for environmental offences, such as, the nature of 
the entity empowered to prosecute (e.g. State or Federal regulatory agency, or 
a Local Authority), and where the fine is paid (e.g. to the prosecuting agency 
or authority, or directly to the affected community).  She also noted that 
statistical data can be misleading.  For example, higher prosecution volumes 
(e.g. New South Wales) can be a symptom of higher levels of offending, a 
more litigious culture, better resourced enforcement agencies and authorities, 
or simply a greater number of prosecuting authorities where prosecution is a 
function of Local Government.  Similarly, reduced prosecution volumes (e.g. 
Victoria) may simply reflect the complexity of contentious cases taking more 
than average time to be tried by the Courts. 
 
What lessons can be drawn from the Australian experience?  Clearly, the alternative 
sentencing mechanisms available in Victoria are much wider than the powers 
available to the District Court in New Zealand given that no connection is required 
between the harm caused by the offence and any positive contribution that may be 
made.  Provision is made for environmental offsets to be made by financial 
contributions required as conditions under s 108(10)(a) of the RMA on the grant of 
resource consent, accordingly extending the scope of matters that may be included in 
an enforcement order made by the Court following prosecution for an offence against 
the RMA would appear to have merit as a legislative amendment that would accord 
with the purpose of the statute.  Similarly, adopting uniform enforcement guidelines 
that view prosecution as a remedy to be used in appropriate cases, rather than only as 
a last resort, could have an influence on the number of prosecutions brought by Local 
Authorities.  There appears to be a willingness in Australia to impose more severe 
penalties where matters of national importance are affected (e.g. clearance of 
significant native vegetation), which questions whether guideline sentences for similar 
offences in New Zealand are appropriately severe and act as a deterrent to future 
offending.  Generally, data on Local Authority enforcement decisions (e.g. the 
reasons why the number of prosecutions appears to be in gradual decline) is not 
available, and enhanced monitoring by the Ministry for the Environment would be 
required in order to enable empirical analysis to answer the observations made by 
Martin about the factors that may influence prosecution for environmental offences. 
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SENTENCING PRINCIPLES 
 
Sentencing is also a discretionary activity.  For example, Professor Geoff Hall has 
observed that: 
 
The task of a sentencing Judge is not an easy one; indeed no task confronting 
the criminal Court is more of an enigma than that of sentencing a convicted 
offender.  The sentencing Judge is vested with a discretion which requires the 
balancing of the often competing demands of sentencing.  He or she must 
weigh, usually intuitively, the various purposes of punishment, consider the 
circumstances of the offence and the characteristics of the offender, and 
choose the sentencing alternative that does justice to the offender, the victim 
and the community alike.xxiv 
 
Sentencing discretion is influenced by a number of matters including legislative 
guidance, appellate guidance, guideline judgments, and tariffs.  The objective is to 
ensure that a principled approach is adopted, and to achieve consistency without 
loosing sight of other competing demands. 
 
Apart from prescribing the sentences that can be imposed by the Court, legislation 
normally reserves “a large measure of discretion” to the sentencing Judge in 
determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in individual cases.  This 
pragmatic approach arises because it would be difficult for Parliament to “foresee and 
provide for the infinite variety of circumstances that may, and will arise” over time.xxv 
 
In general terms, the maximum penalty will provide a comparative indication of “the 
seriousness with which the class of offence is regarded by [Parliament]”.xxvi  
However, in practice the maximum penalty will not be relevant in all cases because it 
will normally be reserved for the “most serious” offending.  Indeed, prosecution 
trends under the RMA demonstrate that “less severe” sentences are normally 
imposed.xxvii 
 
The RMA does not impose mandatory penalties, and does not include any express 
statutory presumption as to the penalty that should be imposed in any particular case.  
However, s 5 clearly anticipates that adverse effects will be avoided, remedied, or 
mitigated.  From an economic perspective this indicates that adverse effects are to be 
internalised.  Accordingly, this implies that punishment should be a strong influence 
on determining the level of any fines imposed in cases where offending has materially 
benefited the offender. 
 
Similarly, the RMA does not contain any statutory or procedural restrictions that 
could affect the sentencing Court’s discretion.  For example, in Machinery Movers the 
High Court noted: 
 
Like many other statutes, the RMA is silent on the matters which may be 
taken into account on sentencing.  To a large extent, the relevant criteria must 
be inferred from a consideration of the broad legislative objectives.xxviii 
 
The general sentencing principles in ss 7-9 of the Sentencing Act 2002, the 
presumption against imprisonment in s 16 of the Act, the guidance on permitted 
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combinations of sentences in s 19 of the Act, the prohibition against imprisonment 
unless the offender has been advised of his or her right to legal counsel in s 30 of the 
Act, and the requirement under s 40 of the Act for means testing of offenders when 
fines or reparation are imposed, will therefore be relevant to sentencing under the 
RMA in the absence of any specific statutory guidance relevant to environmental 
offences.  The sentencing principles in ss 7 and 8 of the Act provide: 
 
7. Purposes of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders 
(1) The purposes for which a court may sentence or otherwise deal with an 
offender are— 
(a) to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the 
community by the offending; or 
(b) to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and an 
acknowledgment of, that harm; or 
(c) to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or 
(d) to provide reparation for harm done by the offending; or 
(e) to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or 
(f) to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or a 
similar offence; or 
(g) to protect the community from the offender; or 
(h) to assist in the offender's rehabilitation and reintegration; or 
(i) a combination of 2 or more of the purposes in paragraphs (a) to (h). 
(2) To avoid doubt, nothing about the order in which the purposes appear 
in this section implies that any purpose referred to must be given greater 
weight than any other purpose referred to. 
 
8. Principles of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders 
In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court— 
(a) must take into account the gravity of the offending in the particular 
case, including the degree of culpability of the offender; and 
(b) must take into account the seriousness of the type of offence in 
comparison with other types of offences, as indicated by the maximum 
penalties prescribed for the offences; and 
(c) must impose the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence if the 
offending is within the most serious of cases for which that penalty is 
prescribed, unless circumstances relating to the offender make that 
inappropriate; and 
(d) must impose a penalty near to the maximum prescribed for the offence 
if the offending is near to the most serious of cases for which that penalty is 
prescribed, unless circumstances relating to the offender make that 
inappropriate; and 
(e) must take into account the general desirability of consistency with 
appropriate sentencing levels and other means of dealing with offenders in 
respect of similar offenders committing similar offences in similar 
circumstances; and 
(f) must take into account any information provided to the court 
concerning the effect of the offending on the victim; and 
(g) must impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the 
circumstances, in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences and orders set 
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out in section 10A; and 
(h) must take into account any particular circumstances of the offender that 
mean that a sentence or other means of dealing with the offender that would 
otherwise be appropriate would, in the particular instance, be 
disproportionately severe; and 
(i) must take into account the offender's personal, family, whanau, 
community, and cultural background in imposing a sentence or other means of 
dealing with the offender with a partly or wholly rehabilitative purpose; and 
(j) must take into account any outcomes of restorative justice processes 
that have occurred, or that the court is satisfied are likely to occur, in relation 
to the particular case (including, without limitation, anything referred to in 
section 10). 
 
The sentencing principles in ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act were considered in 
relation to the prosecution of environmental offences in Selwyn Mews Ltd v Auckland 
City Council. xxix  Generally, the decision confirms the relevance of the principles 
regarding offences against the RMA, but questions the applicability of s 9 regarding 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors because this provision is drafted 
in terms which are more relevant to general criminal offending than environmental 
offences.  The High Court held: 
 
[36] ... [The Sentencing Act 2002] calls for a systematic approach to 
sentencing, commencing with a consideration of the purposes of sentencing 
under s 7. Not all those purposes will always be relevant to sentencing in 
environmental cases. For example, in some cases the harm done may be to the 
community generally rather than specific members of it. Reparation to 
particular victims may be relevant in some cases but not others. Rehabilitation 
will have no relevance to corporate offenders and may not be relevant to 
individuals who are otherwise of good character. 
[37] But many of the purposes of sentencing in s 7 will usually be relevant in 
environmental cases including holding the offender accountable for harm 
done; promoting a sense of responsibility for the harm; denunciation and 
deterrence (both personally and generally). 
[38] The principles of sentencing in s 8 will also be relevant particularly 
(under s8(a)) the gravity of the offending and the degree of culpability 
involved. That will include the extent of any damage or adverse effects caused 
to the environment and the extent to which there was deliberate or reckless 
conduct. As well, the court will need to consider the issues of seriousness of 
the offence and penalties under s 8(b), (c), and (d); consistency in sentencing 
levels under s 8(e); the effects on victims under s 8(f) where applicable; and 
the particular circumstances of the offender under s 8(h) and (i). Where there 
are issues about mitigating any adverse effects on the environment such as 
repairing damage or clean up work, then s 8(j) and 10 will become relevant. 
[39] Aggravating and mitigating factors under s 9 are to be considered. 
Although a number of these do not have particular relevance in environmental 
cases, the matters to be considered are not exclusive: s 9(4). 
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Section 9(4) of the Sentencing Act therefore provides the Court with flexibility to 
consider (where relevant) other factors not listed in the statute when deciding RMA 
prosecutions.  For example, in R v Borrett the Court of Appeal when deciding an 
appeal against a sentence of imprisonment for unauthorised clearance of native bush 
and earthworks in the Waitakere Ranges in contravention of the rules in the relevant 
District Plan, and an interim enforcement order made by the Environment Court, 
referred to the aggravating factors recorded in the decision under appeal and held:xxx 
 
[18] The appellant’s view seems to be that he is entitled to do what he likes on 
his land and that what he has done does not impact on the wider environment.  
He is, of course, wrong on both those counts.  The Resource Management Act 
recognises that the rights of a land owner are subject to broader public 
considerations.  As to the wider environment, it can be destroyed by 
incremental activities such as those undertaken by the appellant. 
[19] The special nature of the area in which the property is situated must be 
emphasised.  The appellant is fully aware of the restrictions upon activities 
that may be undertaken in that area. 
[20] There is no doubt that the history of activity on the site is one of contempt 
both for the provisions of the Resource Management Act and for the orders of 
the Environment Court.  It is appropriate in those circumstances that a 
significant penalty be imposed.  We consider that the District Court Judge was 
entirely correct in determining that imprisonment was the appropriate response 
to the contempt shown by the appellant. 
[21] We take the view, however, that what was required by the nature of the 
offending was a short prison sentence sufficient to make it clear to the 
appellant that the Courts would not countenance behaviour such as his, but no 
more than was required for that purpose.  We consider that 20 weeks was 
excessive and we concluded that the appropriate term was one of 12 weeks 
imprisonment. 
[22] As to the costs order, we note that the appellant and his wife still owe 
some $9,000 from the earlier fines imposed.  Their circumstances are such that 
it is not possible to say that the appellant has the financial means to meet the 
additional imposition of a costs order.  In those circumstances we concluded 
that this was not a case where a monetary penalty should be added to the 
prison sentence and for that reason we quashed the costs order. 
 
Empirical research indicates that the utility of sentencing guidelines is dependent on 
the attitude of sentencing Judges toward their introduction.  For example, surveys 
undertaken by Timmins found that Judges exhibit a strong preference for optional 
sentencing guidelines that “can be used on a case-by-case basis”, and that the 
implementation of sentencing guidelines by Judges is more likely to be influenced by 
peer pressure from within the Judiciary rather than concerns about public perception.  
As a result Timmins considered that Parliament should be concerned about such 
matters as they “might be important in determining compliance” with sentencing 
legislation, and observed that Parliament may also wish “to consider the potential 
impact of such reforms on sentencing outcomes such as disparity and prison 
populations”.xxxi  In particular, the research found that experimentation with different 
sentencing guidelines could produce differing results by decreasing or increasing 
disparity between sentencing outcomes regarding the same type of offending (e.g. 
aggravated burglary). 
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The conclusions reached by Timmins have been echoed in a paper prepared for the 
Legislation Advisory Committee by Justice William Young, President of the Court of 
Appeal.  For example, he stated:xxxii 
 
Those who promote legislation which will affect the conduct and outcomes of 
everyday litigation necessarily rely heavily on the willingness and ability of 
the courts to implement the underlying legislative policies. 
 
When examining the “congruence” between the provisions of the Sentencing Act 2002 
and sentencing practice Justice Young found that the statute differed from practice in 
two important respects.  First, the Act does not include any reference to the “starting 
point” used in the context of determining what the appropriate sentence of 
imprisonment should be.  Second, tariff sentencing is also not addressed in the Act.  
These discrepancies between legislation and practice led Justice Young to 
comment:xxxiii 
 
A legal purist might be dismayed by the differences between actual sentencing 
practice and what appears to be contemplated by the Act.  But these 
differences (and what they imply as to legislative understanding of the way 
sentencing is carried out) are of practical significance as well.  This is because 
a legislative system which builds on existing judicial practice is unlikely to 
function as intended if there is any significant misunderstanding as to what 
that practice actually is.  Such misunderstanding might account for some of 
the difficulties and perhaps anomalies which have arisen in respect of 
sentencing for murder and the fixing of minimum terms in relation to 
determinate sentences. 
 
Notwithstanding these discrepancies between the provisions of the Sentencing Act and 
judicial practice, the legislative objective of increasing sentences for the most serious 
offenders appears to have been met regarding the prosecution of offences against the 
RMA.  The first two sentences of imprisonment have been imposed since the Act was 
passed, and there has been a small increase in the level of fines imposed with the 
highest fines having increased from $50,000 to $55,000 since the Act was passed. 
 
 
APPELLATE GUIDANCE 
 
The development of appellate guidance has arisen as a direct consequence of the 
provision made for appeals against sentence in the Sentencing Act and its statutory 
predecessors.  Professor Hall summarises the benefits of appellate guidance as 
follows:xxxiv 
 
Appellate review enables questions of policy and principle to be raised and 
resolved.  It facilitates the development of a measure of consistency, without 
undermining the importance of judicial discretion in the individual case.  
Appellate review is a now well-established means of controlling sentencing 
discretion, reducing sentencing disparity and giving general guidance on 
sentencing principles. 
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As a result it is now common practice for sentencing Judges to refer to previous 
decisions either to refer to the principles set out in leading judgments, or to provide an 
indication of the “type and level of sentence regarded as appropriate in similar 
cases”.xxxv  However, the practice of referring to previous sentencing decisions has 
raised the question of whether such decisions should be regarded as precedents or 
guidelines?  The English Court of Appeal resolved this question in R v De Havilland 
by preferring to regard previous sentencing decisions as guidelines.  The Court 
held:xxxvi 
 
As in any branch of the law which depends on judicial discretion, decisions on 
sentencing are no more than examples of how the Court has dealt with a 
particular offender in relation to a particular offence.  As such they may be 
useful as an aid to uniformity of sentence for a particular category of crime; 
but they are not authoritative in the strict sense … the sentencer retains his 
discretion within the guidelines, or even to depart from them if the particular 
circumstances of the case justify departure. 
 
In terms of their potential utility to the sentencing Court, Professor Hall has divided 
previous sentencing decisions into four broad categories.  First, precedent decisions 
dealing with statutory interpretation of relevant legislative provisions.  Second, 
decisions which set out rules of practice relevant to the exercise of sentencing 
discretion.  Third, guideline judgments relevant to the type and level of sentence that 
may be appropriate.  Fourth, decisions which provide practical examples of the 
application of sentencing guidelines.  In particular, Hall observed:xxxvii 
 
The relatively recently developed “guideline judgment” … seems destined to 
become the most important vehicle of the future for the formulation and 
dissemination of judicial sentencing policy.  On any narrow view of the 
doctrine of precedent, such guidelines … must be considered obiter, but it is 
clearly intended that they should be observed by the trial Courts, although they 
are not to be slavishly followed or blindly adhered to when the facts of a 
particular case warrant departure from them. 
 
However, Professor Hall also identifies three disadvantages of guideline decisions in 
sentencing.  First, the approach is ad hoc and fact specific.  Second, the process of 
identifying guideline decisions is “time-consuming” and requires analysis of all 
sentencing decisions.  Third, the selected guideline decisions may be inconsistent and 
therefore prove difficult to apply in practice.xxxviii 
 
The utility of guideline judgments therefore derives from their potential to assist 
sentencing Courts to develop a consistent and uniform approach to sentencing in 
similar cases.  Professor Hall observes that:xxxix 
 
Guideline judgments are judicial narrative guidelines that are intended to give 
authoritative guidance to trial Judges in a certain sphere of sentencing.  They 
are judgments that go beyond the point raised in the particular appeal and 
which outline general principles of sentencing for given offences. 
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A flexible approach is required to the application of guideline judgements in order to 
avoid a “rigid or mathematical” approach to sentencing.  For example, in R v 
Clotworthy Tipping J noted that:xl 
 
Within which category an individual case falls, and where within the band 
applicable to that category, are matters of judgment depending on all the 
relevant circumstances of the case.  While categories and bands are useful 
guides in the sentencing process, the question of what sentence is appropriate 
to the individual case is ultimately a matter of judgment on the basis of all the 
relevant factors.  Care must be taken not to let categorisation result in too rigid 
or mathematical an approach. 
 
The penalties imposed in guideline judgments provide a general indication of the type 
and level of sentence or “tariff” that may be appropriate in similar cases.  Professor 
Hall has, however, noted that tariffs have been limited to “straightforward subjects … 
which call for the imposition of retributive or deterrent sentence”.xli 
 
 
APPLICATION OF GUIDELINE JUDGMENTS 
 
Guideline judgments are likely to be of greatest value to the sentencing Court where 
they “differentiate between the relative gravity of specific offences”, or where they 
provide a starting point or benchmark for sentencing, or where they define 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that should be had regard to when 
sentencing.xlii 
 
For example, the decision of the High Court in Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland 
Regional Council has exerted considerable influence on sentencing under the 
RMA.xliii  The case involved an appeal against sentence regarding an unauthorised 
discharge of timber treatment chemicals into a stream.  In the absence of any specific 
New Zealand authority the High Court cited with approval the sentencing guidance 
provided by the Canadian decision in R v Bata Industries Ltd.  The Court in Bata 
held:xliv 
 
Breaches of these regulations and laws must be dealt with in such fashion as to 
prevent their repetition and to foster the principle of environmentally 
responsible corporate citizenship … The purpose of sentencing an offender is 
to protect the public, to deter and rehabilitate the offender, to promote 
compliance with the law, and to express public disapproval of the act … There 
are unique sentencing considerations to bear in mind in public welfare 
offences, but there can be no doubt that the protection of the public is the 
primary consideration in sentencing in this field. 
Within the subtopic of public welfare offences, environmental offences have 
their own set of special considerations … The severity of the sentence should 
vary in accordance with several factors, including: 
 
A. The nature of the environment affected; 
B. The extent of the damage afflicted; 
C. The deliberateness of the offence; 
D. The attitude of the accused. 
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In sentencing corporations convicted of environmental offences, the Court 
should consider: 
 
A. The size, wealth, nature of operations and power of the corporation; 
B. The extent of attempts to comply; 
C. Remorse; 
D. Profits [generated] by the offence; 
E. Criminal record or other evidence of good character. 
 
When a Court imposes a penalty in respect of an environmental offence, the 
level should reflect the gravity of that particular offence and leave room for 
the most serious of circumstances.  The harshest sentences ought to be 
reserved for the worst possible factual situation. 
 
The decision in Machinery Movers has been regularly cited in subsequent 
prosecutions under the RMA, and the guidelines in Bata have been referred to by the 
sentencing Courts.  More recently, the decision of the High Court in Selwyn Mews 
confirmed that the Sentencing Act 2002 applies generally to all sentencing decisions, 
including offences against the RMA.  The Court also confirmed the continued 
relevance of the decision in Machinery Movers to sentencing under the RMA, but 
held that Machinery Movers must now be applied in light of the provisions of the 
Sentencing Act.  The decision in Selwyn Mews (as noted above) also provides 
guidance on the application of relevant provisions of the Sentencing Act to offences 
against the RMA.  The Court held: 
 
[40] In environmental cases, fines will most often be the appropriate penalty. 
There are a number of provisions of the Sentencing Act relevant to fines. 
Section 13 provides that a fine must be imposed unless any of the specified 
exceptions in s 13(1)(a), (b), (c), or (d) applies. Other provisions relevant to 
fines are s 14 and 39 to 43. Obviously, the capacity of the offender to pay a 
fine will be very relevant and the court has power to order an offender to make 
a declaration of financial capacity if necessary. That might have been a useful 
tool in the present case. 
[41] Under the Resource Management Act, the court also has power to impose 
a sentence of imprisonment or community work: s 339(1) and (4). If a 
sentence of imprisonment is being considered, s 16 of the Sentencing Act is 
important. First, regard must be had to the desirability of keeping offenders in 
the community so far as practicable in terms of s(1). Secondly, there is a 
presumption against imprisonment under s 16(2). Section 8(g) is also relevant 
(the least restrictive outcome in the circumstances). 
[42] Under the Resource Management Act, enforcement orders under s 314 
may also be made either instead of or in addition to other penalties: s 339(5). 
As monetary orders may be made under s 314(d), reparation under the 
Sentencing Act may have less relevance in environmental cases but the power 
exists under s 12, 14 and 32 to 38. Where a monetary order is not made under 
s 314(d), attention must be given to s 12 of the Sentencing Act which requires 
a reparation order to be made where a victim has suffered loss or damage to 
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property unless it would create undue hardship or there are other special 
circumstances rendering such an order inappropriate. 
 
Subsequently, in R v Conway the Court of Appeal determined an appeal against 
sentence regarding offences of discharging contaminants onto land in circumstances 
where they may enter water, and failure to comply with abatement notices issued by 
the Auckland Regional Council and enforcement orders made by the Environment 
Court.xlv  The facts of the case related to the operation of an unauthorised scrap yard 
in Otara in close proximity to a stream that flowed into the sensitive environment of 
the Tamaki Estuary, in contravention of the rules in the relevant Regional and District 
Plans.  Mr Conway was sentenced to three months imprisonment, Cash for Scrap (his 
company) was fined $25,000, and Millennium Investments (the land owner) was fined 
$15,000.  The principal issue on appeal was whether Mr Conway should have been 
sentenced to community work or a term of imprisonment.  Heath J stated: 
 
[59] The starting point is the need to view the sentence of community work as 
a real and effective alternative to imprisonment … However, it is clear that a 
community based sentence (while being a real and effective alternative) may 
not be an appropriate sentence in cases where accountability for harm done to 
the community, deterrence and denunciation are the most important sentencing 
goals … 
[64] The sentencing goals that influenced Judge Doogue to impose a term of 
imprisonment were accountability for the harm done to the community (s 
7(1)(a) Sentencing Act), denunciation (s 7(1)(c)) and deterrence (s 7(1)(f)).  
All of those goals are specifically mentioned in s 16(2)(a) in relation to the 
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. 
[65] In our view, the Judge was right to choose the sentencing option that best 
met the goals of accountability, denunciation and deterrence.  There is a world 
of difference, in the minds of most members of the community, between a 
sentence of imprisonment and a sentence of community work … A short 
sentence of imprisonment may well deter Mr Conway from behaving in this 
way again.  He will realise that further offending of this type is likely to result 
in a longer period of imprisonment.  Equally, it may well deter other members 
of the community, of similar mind to Mr Conway, from ignoring or 
deliberately flouting the provisions of the [RMA] or orders of the 
Environment Court. 
[66] If a sentence of imprisonment were not imposed potential offenders might 
well regard the economic risk of a fine, or the possible sanction of community 
work, as a risk worth taking to gain profit from illegal activities … 
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In arriving at this decision the appellate Court found that it was required to apply the 
RMA and the Sentencing Act in “harmony”, that the Sentencing Act was intended to 
apply to all sentencing, that following Machinery Movers protection of the public was 
the primary consideration when sentencing offenders under the RMA, and that the 
proper approach to sentencing for environmental offences was that set out in Selwyn 
Mews.xlvi  The decisions in Borrett and Conway also demonstrate that the legislative 
objective of increasing the sanctions imposed on the worst offenders is being 
implemented in the RMA context.  For example, Justice Young noted:xlvii 
 
I do not have any statistics which indicate, one way or the other, whether the 
enhanced relevance of statutory maxima has had significant impact on the 
lengths of prison sentences which are being imposed.  What I can say, 
however, is that the new legislation has been recognised by the Court of 
Appeal in guideline sentencing judgments as a factor which must be 
recognised when tariffs are imposed.  This will have a filter down effect on 
sentencing decisions. 
 
The sentence imposed in Borrett clearly provided a guideline for the Court in Conway 
which also considered that a short, sharp, shock was required to curb non-compliance 
with the RMA by the offender. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A broad range of enforcement tools are provided in the RMA to deal with breaches of 
the statute, including prosecution.  From 1994 onwards the New Zealand Courts have 
developed a principled approach to sentencing for environmental offences.  As a 
result there has been a large measure of consistency in the fines imposed by the 
Courts for offences against the RMA.  The level of fines imposed under the RMA, 
however, remains low when compared with emerging trends from the Commonwealth 
of Australia and New South Wales.  Whilst the Sentencing Act 2002 has encouraged 
the Courts to experiment with a wider range of sentencing options and has resulted in 
the first two sentences of imprisonment being imposed under the RMA, the approach 
of Local Authorities to prosecution remains one of “last resort”. 
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APPENDIX 
 
9. Aggravating and mitigating factors 
(1) In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court must take into 
account the following aggravating factors to the extent that they are applicable in the 
case: 
(a) that the offence involved actual or threatened violence or the actual or 
threatened use of a weapon: 
(b) that the offence involved unlawful entry into, or unlawful presence in, a 
dwelling place: 
(c) that the offence was committed while the offender was on bail or still subject 
to a sentence: 
(d) the extent of any loss, damage, or harm resulting from the offence: 
(e) particular cruelty in the commission of the offence: 
(f) that the offender was abusing a position of trust or authority in relation to the 
victim: 
(g) that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of his or her age or health 
or because of any other factor known to the offender: 
(h) that the offender committed the offence partly or wholly because of hostility 
towards a group of persons who have an enduring common characteristic such as race, 
colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, or disability; and 
(i) the hostility is because of the common characteristic; and 
(ii) the offender believed that the victim has that characteristic: 
(ha) that the offence was committed as part of, or involves, a terrorist act (as 
defined in section 5(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002): 
(i) premeditation on the part of the offender and, if so, the level of premeditation 
involved: 
(j) the number, seriousness, date, relevance, and nature of any previous 
convictions of the offender and of any convictions for which the offender is being 
sentenced or otherwise dealt with at the same time. 
(2) In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court must take into 
account the following mitigating factors to the extent that they are applicable in the 
case: 
(a) the age of the offender: 
(b) whether and when the offender pleaded guilty: 
(c) the conduct of the victim: 
(d) that there was a limited involvement in the offence on the offender's part: 
(e) that the offender has, or had at the time the offence was committed, diminished 
intellectual capacity or understanding: 
(f) any remorse shown by the offender, or anything as described in section 10: 
(g) any evidence of the offender's previous good character. 
(3) Despite subsection (2)(e), the court must not take into account by way of 
mitigation the fact that the offender was, at the time of committing the offence, 
affected by the voluntary consumption or use of alcohol or any drug or other 
substance (other than a drug or other substance used for bona fide medical purposes). 
(4) Nothing in subsection (1) or subsection (2)— 
(a) prevents the court from taking into account any other aggravating or mitigating 
factor that the court thinks fit; or 
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(b) implies that a factor referred to in those subsections must be given greater 
weight than any other factor that the court might take into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Hall, G Sentencing - 2007 Reforms in Context (2007) 
Martin, R Trends in Environmental Prosecution NELA 2005 National Conference 
Ministry for the Environment A Study into the Use of Prosecutions under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (May 2002) 
Ministry for the Environment A Study into the Use of Prosecutions under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (February 2006) 
Preston, B Principled Sentencing for Environmental Offences 4th International IUCN 
Academy of Environmental Law Colloquium (October 2006) 
Timmins, P Empirical Research on Judicial Attitudes to Guideline Sentencing 
Sentencing 2006 Conference 
Young, W Judicial implementation of legislative policy: Ruminations on the impact of 
the Sentencing Act 2002 on sentencing practice and prison matters Legislation 
Advisory Committee 
 
 
                                                 
i See ss 11-15 of the RMA. 
ii See ss 310-313 in Part 12 of the RMA. 
iii See ss 314-321 in Part 12 of the RMA. 
iv Local Authorities may, by warrant under s 38 of the RMA, appoint any Local Authority 
employee; the employee of another Local Authority; any person employed by the 
Department of Conservation or the Ministry for the Environment or the Maritime Safety 
Authority to carry out the functions and powers of enforcement officers under the RMA. 
v See ss 322-325B in Part 12 of the RMA. 
vi See ss 338-343 in Part 12 of the RMA.  Criminal jurisdiction under the RMA is 
exercised by Environment Judges sitting in the District Court as District Court Judges.  
All Environment Judges also hold warrants to sit as District Court Judges. 
vii See ss 9 & 338 of the RMA. 
viii See ss 11 & 338 of the RMA. 
ix See ss 12 & 338 of the RMA. 
x See ss 13 & 338 of the RMA. 
xi See ss 14 & 338 of the RMA. 
xii See ss 15 & 338 of the RMA. 
xiii See s 338 of the RMA. 
xiv DC Otahuhu, CRN 3048009825, 27 September 1993, Judge Willy. 
xv DC Auckland, CRN 9048006616-9, 29 September 2000, Judge Whiting. 
xvi District Court, T031951, 4 September 2003, Judge McElrea at paragraph 26. 
xvii [1998] 1 NZLR 104. 
xviii MfE pp4-10. 
xix DC New Plymouth, CRN 5043008689, 22 October 1996, Judge Bollard. 
  
 
23
                                                                                                                                            
xx MfE pp6-14. 
xxi Martin, R Trends in Environmental Prosecution NELA 2005 National Conference. 
xxii Ibid, p12. 
xxiii Ibid, pp13-14. 
xxiv Hall, G Sentencing 2007 Reforms in Context (2007) p1. 
xxv Fisheries Inspector v Turner [1978] 2 NZLR 233 at 237 per Richardson J. 
xxvi Ibid. 
xxvii Hall, p2. 
xxviii [1994] 1 NZLR 492 at 501. 
xxix High Court, Auckland, CRI2003-404-159 to 161. 
xxx Court of Appeal, CA422/03, 10 December 2003, Tipping, Panckhurst, and Salmon JJ 
(reasons for judgment of the Court delivered by Salmon J). 
xxxi Timmins, P Empirical Research on Judicial Attitudes to Guideline Sentencing Sentencing 2006 
Conference, pp5, 8, & 11. 
xxxii Young, W Judicial implementation of legislative policy: Ruminations on the impact of the 
Sentencing Act 2002 on sentencing practice and prison matters Legislation Advisory Committee, 
paragraph 1. 
xxxiii Young, paragraph 36. 
xxxiv Hall, p5. 
xxxv Hall, p5. 
xxxvi (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 109 at 114. 
xxxvii Hall, p6. 
xxxviii Hall, p7. 
xxxix Hall, pp7-8. 
xl (1998) 15 CRNZ 651 at 655. 
xli Hall, p48. 
xlii Hall, p8. 
xliii [1994] 1 NZLR 492 at 501. 
xliv (1992) 9 OR (3d) 329 dealing with liability, and 7 CELR (NS) 293 dealing with 
sentencing. 
xlv Court of Appeal, CA234/04, 8 November 2004, William Young, Randerson, and 
Heath JJ (reasons for judgment of the Court delivered by Heath J). 
xlvi Ibid, paragraphs [60]-[63]. 
xlvii Young, W Judicial implementation of legislative policy: Ruminations on the impact of the 
Sentencing Act 2002 on sentencing practice and prison matters Legislation Advisory Committee, 
paragraph 9. 
